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LEGAL LIMITS OF COASTAL FISHERY PROTECTION
EDWARD W. ALLEN
Lawyers of the Pacific Coast and all lawyers dealing with interna-
tional law will be interested in President Truman's proclamation of
September 28th,1 wherein he sets forth a constructive policy for the
control and conservation of the coastal fisheries of this and other nations.
Thus is brought to consummation a campaign originating on this coast
some ten years ago to demand that our government review the subject of
ocean fisheries and adopt an affirmative policy consistent with existing
facts and a rational interpretation of international law.
In the past, our government frequently acted on the assumption that
the so-called "Three Mile Rule'--that a nation owns a strip of water
along its coast just three miles wide-was determinative of all off-shore
jurisdictional problems. This was such an easy yardstick to apply that
there was an overpowering temptation to ignore the origin and history
of this so-called rule, as well as the contemporary foreign practice
concerning it, except when rum-running or war disturbed this com-
placent attitude.
Protection of our coastal fisheries seemed to some of our officials to
be such a minor matter internationally that it was not until the Japanese
invasion of the Alaska salmon fishery threatened largely to destroy this
exceedingly valuable American industry and even to involve this coun-
try in bloodshed and war that serious official attention to this subject
could be secured.
It has been incontestably proved that some of the most valuable
coastal fisheries, such as salmon and halibut, are susceptible to deple-
tion by over-fishing, though such fishing be pursued more than three
miles off shore. Also, it has been demonstrated by Canada and the
United States that these same fisheries can be restored and maintained
by proper conservation methods. In the case of Pacific Coast, halibut,
almost nine-tenths of which is caught on the continental shelf but more
than three miles off shore, the success of conservation was due to a
joint effort-through the International Fisheries Commisgion created by
treaty between this country and Canada.2
110 Fw. REG. 12, 304 (1945).
For factual background see: TxomAS W. FULTON, TM SovEmEG=NT OF
THE SEA, Edinburgh and London, 1911; GREGoRY and BAMHs, NoRTH PAcnImc
Fmims, New York, 1939; Jozo ToMAsEvcE, INTERNATIONAL AGRENas ON
CONSERVATION OF MA=E REsoURcEs, Stanford University, 1943.
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The international law involved has not been so dear. The modem
development of the law of marginal or territorial waters commenced
with Hugo Grotius in the early part of the seventeenth century. Grotius,
though a profound scholar, was also an aggressive advocate of Dutch
interests. He was in thorough sympathy with the two great Dutch
ambitions relating to the sea: (1) desire to fish for herring off the
British and Scotch coasts, and (2) desire to promote Dutch seaborne
trade. Grotius, therefore, became the great exponent of the doctrine of
freedom of the seas. Bynkershoek, another Dutchman, later developed
the so-called cannonball doctrine-that a nation is entitled to paramount
jurisdiction over so much, but so much only, of the sea as it can defend
from the shore with cannon.
Although England under the Stuarts opposed the Dutch theories, when
later England became dominant on the seas, she also became the aggres-
sive proponent of the three-mile limitation into which the cannonball
concept had been rationalized on the premise that cannon would never
shoot farther than that distance.
England's position was due to a desire to reduce to a minimum the
waters from which her fishing vessels might be excluded or in which her
merchant marine and navy might be subject to restrictions of the coastal
state. That the United States in the first instance acquiesced in this
policy was largely due to the fact that New England fishermen wished
to frequent the waters adjacent to Canada and Newfoundland. Subse-
quently treaties and arbitration defined these Atlantic Coast rights, but
the basis for this country's adherence to the rule was not re-examined.
It will hardly be asserted that the origin or promotion of the so-called
three-mile rule was due to that "sense of justice, humanity, righteous-
ness, evolved under the reign of God in the hearts and minds of think-
ing men" which Andrew D. White attributes to Grotius.' On the
contrary, it was due to conflicting pressures of dominant national inter-
ests of strong naval powers.
So much has been written within the last ten years concerning the
three-mile rule4 that it is sufficient to say that two divergent points of
view existed both within and without governmental circles. One group
looked upon the rule as such a settled and immutable principle of inter-
national law that it could only be modified by universal international
agreement. If, therefore, such universal agreement were unobtainable,
S1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. 1945) 2.
'For an historical and analytical review of the subject, see: STEPAN A.
RiESENFELD, PRoTEcTIoN OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Washington, 1942, reviewed in (1942) 52 YALE L. J. 196. For static academic
adherence to the Three Mile Rule see: L. LARRY LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF FISHERIES, Washington, 1944, reviewed in (1945) 58 HARv. L.
REv. 1106. For constructive criticism of the static academic view of the
subject see: JOSEPH W. BINGHAM, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PACIFIC COASTAL FISHERIES, Stanford University, 1938, reviewed in (1939)
14 WASH. L. REV. 91, under title: "Control of Fisheries Beyond Three Miles,"
by Edward W. Allen.
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a nation would have to sit supinely by while foreigners came, across the
sea to destroy its coastal fisheries.
The other group maintained: (1) that there has never been anything
peculiarly sacrosanct about the rule; (2) that, in fact, the concept had
never become an "established principle" of international law, but no
more than a rule of policy for such nations as chose to adopt it-
which many nations, perhaps a majority, had not chosen to do-and
could be abandoned at will by any nation which had previously espoused
it; (3) that even if the rule should be accepted or adhered to as defining
the bounds of national territory, it did not constitute a geographical
limit for all purposes, and particularly that the assertion of a nation's
right to protect its coastal fisheries an adequate distance off shore is not
inconsistent with maintenance of the three-mile limit as defining the
bounds of national territory.
The view last expressed appears to be that which the President and
the present Secretary of State have adopted. The proclamation defines
the purposes of the United States to be: (1) to establish zones, and
exercise fishery control thereover, in areas of the high seas contiguous
to our coasts adequate for the conservation of fisheries developed alone
by our nationals. (The proclamation does not confine the zones to the
continental shelf.) This will apply to practically all of our coastal fish-
eries from California to Alaska except such as have been developed
jointly with Canada. (2) To establish similar zones in conjunction with
another nation where the fisheries have been jointly developed by its
nationals and ours. This will apply to all the fisheries from California
to Alaska except those covered by the first provision, as no nationals
other than Canadians can be credited with joint development with us of
any Pacific Coast fisheries. Canada and the United States have already
demonstrated ability to cooperate in the control of joint fisheries. (3 To
recognize in other nations rights correlative to ours. (4) Not to affect
rights of navigation.
-In an executive order of the same date,5 President Truman has placed
the duty of implementing the proclamation in the hands of the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of the Interior. It remains to be seen how
promptly these officials will act and what they will propose. A feeling
exists that some of the subordinate officials to whom fishery matters have
recently been assigned in the Department of State may not be in sym-
pathy with the proclamation. For this and other reasons an effort is
being made to induce the Secretary of State in his pending reorganization
to reestablish a fishery division on a high level, such as was done by
Secretary Hull, and to appoint to it officials who not only are in accord
with the spirit of the proclamation but have the background and ability
to make immediate application of its principles.
5 Executive Order No. 9634, 10 FED. REa. 12, 305 (1945).
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Past administrative adherence to an unsound international policy
which lacks universal acceptance cannot estop a nation from reconsider-
ing such policy and then aligning itself with those nations which, despite
attempts to coerce them, have refused to acquiesce in that which is
basically wrong. Certainly a policy which promotes the unnecessary
destruction of one of the world's greatest natural food resources-the
fish of the sea-is both unsound and antisocial. In partial extenuation
of past indifference to the subject it should be noted that the exhausti-
bility of ocean fisheries is a fact of only recent ascertainment and that the
concept of ocean fishery conservation is wholly modem.
It would be legitimate for this country, if so minded, to abandon
earlier contentions and claim a greater width for our territorial waters.
Our government has not hesitated to abandon principles of international
law which were far more firmly established, when it was felt that the
exigencies of war justified such a course. Certainly the preservation of a
gigantic food supply urgently needed by a hungry world should be no
less justifiable.
However, the proclamation does not purport to abandon the three-mile
rule. Yet it is clearly inferred that the rule cannot be so applied as to
interfere with this country's right to conserve its coastal fisheries. The
rule may still continue to govern the delimitation of territorial boun-
daries. In fact, the official release which accompanied the announce-
ment of the fishery proclamation, as well as a concurrent proclamation
concerning oil and mineral rights on the continental shelf, states, as to
the latter, that it "in no wise abridges the right of free and unimpeded
navigation of waters of the character of high seas above the shelf, nor
does it extend the present limits of the Territorial waters of the United
States." There is nothing novel about such an interpretation of current
international law. Indeed, there have been so many exceptions to and
qualifications of the three-mile rule that it would be difficult for this or
any country to determine what it does embrace. Even England has
skillfully avoided commitment to such an arbitrary interpretation of the
rule as would interfere with the assumption of whatever position might
appear at any particular time to be in the interest of the Empire.
The proclamation does assert, in effect, that this nation has a special
interest in the fisheries adjacent to its coast which its own fishermen
have exclusively developed and that the welfare of the nation is vitally
involved in their conservation, hence that control will be exercised over
them to whatever distance is deemed to be necessary. Less than this
would be an admission of impotence with respect to a great responsi-
bility. International law must be made responsive to realities if it is to
attain the wholesome development which the United Nations' Charter
contemplates.
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